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Abstract
People can conceptualize the same action (e.g. ‘riding a bike’) at different levels of abstraction (LOA), where higher LOAs
specify the abstract motives that explain why the action is performed (e.g. ‘getting exercise’), while lower LOAs specify the
concrete steps that indicate how the action is performed (e.g. ‘gripping handlebars’). Prior neuroimaging studies have shown
that why and how questions about actions differentially activate two cortical networks associated with mental-state reason-
ing and action representation, respectively; however, it remains unknown whether this is due to the differential demands
of the questions per se or to the shifts in LOA those questions produce. We conducted functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing while participants judged pairs of action phrases that varied in LOA and that could be framed either as a why question
(Why ride a bike? Get exercise.) or a how question (How to get exercise? Ride a bike.). Question framing (why vs how) had no
effect on activity in regions of the two networks. Instead, these regions uniquely tracked parametric variation in LOA, both
across and within trials. This suggests that the human capacity to understand actions at different LOA is based in the rela-
tive activity of two cortical networks.
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Introduction
People have a rich set of concepts for representing actions and a
flexible capacity to use these concepts to understand both their
own and other people’s actions. This allows humans to not only
understand the meaning of different actions, but also understand
that the same action can carry different meanings. For instance,
an action initially identified as ‘writing a manuscript’ might be
further conceptualized in terms of its abstract motives—i.e. why
it is done (e.g. ‘sharing knowledge’)—or its concrete implementa-
tion—i.e. how it is done (e.g. ‘typing words’). The present study at-
tempted to clarify the neural basis of conceptualizing an action at
varying levels of abstraction (LOA).
Several recent neuroimaging studies have shown that an-
swering why vs how questions about action reliably differenti-
ates activity in two left-lateralized cortical networks (Spunt
et al., 2010, 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a,b; Spunt and
Adolphs, 2014). Specifically, the Why>How contrast reliably
reveals activation in the dorsomedial and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (PFC), the anterior superior temporal sulcus
(STS), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the posterior cin-
gulate cortex (PCC)—regions that have been independently
implicated in representing and reasoning about the mental
states that typically drive actions, such as beliefs, desires and
intentions (Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe, 2006; Carrington and
Bailey, 2009; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Lieberman, 2010;
Mar, 2011; Denny et al., 2012; Schurz et al., 2014). Conversely, the
How>Why contrast reliably activates the dorsal and ventral
premotor cortex (PMC), posterior middle temporal gyrus (MTG),
rostral inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and dorsal precuneus—
regions that have been independently implicated in represent-
ing the visual motion patterns and somatomotor features of
actions when perceived and performed (Caspers et al., 2010;
Molenberghs et al., 2012; Rizzolatti et al., 2014), conceptualized
(Kemmerer et al., 2012; Watson et al., 2013; Urgesi et al., 2014),
and verbally processed (Kemmerer et al., 2012; Pulvermuller,
2013; Kemmerer, 2015).
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The reliable cortical dissociation of why and how questions is
based on an attentional manipulation referred to as the Why/
How Task (Freitas et al., 2004), where participants are asked to
answer (or evaluate answers to) why and how questions about
the same stimuli (e.g. named or visually presented actions).
This ensures that any observed effects are caused by the differ-
ent cognitive demands of answering a why vs how question
about the same action. Yet, the nature of these differential
demands—and their relationship to the why/how distinction—
remains unclear. Here, we evaluate two alternative accounts of
the robust neural effects observed in the why/how contrast.
These alternatives are suggested by the hierarchical structure
of human representations of action (Vallacher and Wegner,
1987; Kozak et al., 2006; see also Fujita et al., 2006; Trope and
Liberman, 2010). To illustrate, consider the role that why and
how questions play in navigating the levels of the conceptual
action hierarchy in Figure 1A. On the one hand, why and how
questions elicit directional (signed) shifts up and down the lev-
els of the hierarchy, respectively. Taking as examples the
intermediate-level phrases ‘make a phone call’ and ‘contact a
friend’, a why question enables an upward movement (‘Why
make a phone call? Contact a friend’), while a how question en-
ables the reverse (‘How to contact a friend? Make a phone call’).
This suggests that the cortical networks modulated by the why/
how contrast may underlie the distinct ‘mindsets’ (Gollwitzer
et al., 1990) for thinking about actions in terms of their motive
vs their implementation.
This account is complicated by the fact that the language
used to represent an action becomes progressively less concrete,
specific, imageable, embodied and emotionally neutral as one as-
cends the levels of the hierarchy. Henceforth, we use the general
term LOA to refer to this basic semantic dimension correlated
with increasing levels of a conceptual action hierarchy. Because
previous neuroimaging studies contrasted why and how ques-
tions about the same actions (e.g. ‘Why/How to contact a friend?)’,
the answers yielded by why questions were likely conceptually
higher in LOA (e.g. ‘Feel connected’) than those yielded by corres-
ponding how questions (e.g. ‘Make a phone call’). For this reason,
the effective ingredient in the why/how contrast may be the dif-
ferential demands of conceptualizing the same action at rela-
tively higher vs lower LOAs. In the present study, we designed a
novel Why/How Task that separates the why/how question
manipulation from the changing conceptual demands imposed
by understanding actions at different LOAs. This task design
exploits the fact that why and how questions can be posed at any
level of a conceptual action hierarchy, making it possible for a
why question (‘Why dial numbers?’) to yield an answer that is
less abstract (‘Make a phone call’’) than an answer (‘Contact a
friend’) to a how question (‘How to feel connected?’). This orthog-
onality allowed us to evaluate the alternative interpretations of
the why/how contrast described above.
Materials and method
Participants
Nineteen right-handed adults participated in the study in
exchange for financial compensation. Participants were neuro-
logically and psychiatrically healthy, had normal/corrected-
to-normal vision, spoke English fluently, had IQ in the normal
range (assessed with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of
Intelligence), and were not pregnant. Participants provided
Fig. 1. Experimental design. (A) One of 25 four-level action hierarchies featured in the experimental task. For each four-level hierarchy the action described by a phrase
at one level (e.g. ‘make a phone call’) was both a commonly accepted motive for performing the action described by the phrase at the level immediately below it (e.g.
‘dial numbers’) and a commonly accepted means for performing the action described by the phrase at the level immediately above it (e.g. ‘contact a friend’). As shown
to the right of the example and described further in the text all phrases were normed on five dimensions used to derive a single factor describing each phrase’s level of
abstraction (LOA). (B) Structure of one of the trials formed by pairing phrases at contiguous levels of the hierarchy. Trials began with an action phrase embedded in
either a why (shown) or how question and concluded with a different action phrase presented as a possible answer. Answer phrases were presented for a maximum
duration of 2250 ms. Once the participant responded, the screen was replaced by a fixation cross until the onset of the next trial.
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written informed consent according to a protocol approved by
the Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of
Technology. Data from two participants were excluded due to
poor task performance (no response to greater than 10% of
trials). This left 17 participants for the analysis (11 males,
6 females; mean age¼ 29.47, age range¼ 21–46). A power ana-
lysis of the Why/How contrast from Spunt and Adolphs (2014)
indicated the present study’s sample size was sufficiently large
to test our hypotheses (see Supplementary Methods).
Action stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 128 syntactically similar phrases, each of
which used a simple verb–complement construction (typically a
transitive verb and its direct object) to describe a familiar type
of human action (the complete set is provided in
Supplementary Table S1). As illustrated in Figure 1A, each
phrase was part of a grouping of four phrases that collectively
formed a conceptual action hierarchy, such that the action
described by a phrase at one level (e.g. ‘Make a phone call’) was
both a commonly accepted motive for the action described by a
phrase at the level below it (e.g. ‘Dial numbers’), and a com-
monly accepted means for the action described by the phrase at
the level above it (e.g. ‘Contact a friend’). By pairing phrases at
contiguous levels, each set of four phrases yielded three why
question–answer pairs (e.g. ‘Why dial numbers? Make a phone
call’) and three how question–answer pairs (e.g. ‘How to make a
phone call? Dial numbers’).
The final group of 25 question–answer pairs was selected by
identifying those that elicited the highest degree of yes/no
response agreement in an independent sample of approxi-
mately 40 native English-speaking adults recruited online via
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (see Supplementary Appendix
A for details). This resulted in 150 total test trials, 30 of which
were foils in that they featured question-answer pairs that were
commonly rejected (e.g. ‘How to show ambition? Serve alcohol’).
These foils were included to check task comprehension and
were not of interest in the fMRI analyses.
We characterized each verb–complement phrase (without
the why and how question markers) on several lexical dimen-
sions, including the number of characters and words and the
average frequency of content words (per million words in the
SUBTLEX database). In addition, we used independent groups of
native English-speaking Mechanical Turk participants to norm
each phrase on five semantic dimensions believed to covary
with the LOA (see Supplementary Appendix A for details): (i)
abstract vs concrete (N¼ 150), (ii) non-imageable vs imageable
(N¼ 97), (iii) broad vs specific (N¼ 97), (iv) mind-dependent vs
body-dependent (N¼ 132) and (v) emotionally valenced vs neu-
tral (N¼ 96), which was calculated as the absolute deviation
from the neutral point on a bipolar (negative/positive) scale.
Inter-rater reliability for all measures was excellent (minimum
intra-class correlation coefficient¼ 0.98; Shrout and Fleiss,
1979). Given their substantial inter-correlation (Table 1), we sub-
jected the five semantic dimensions to a principal component
analysis (PCA) using the MATLAB Statistics Toolbox (version
R2014b; MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, USA). The PCA
showed that a single component explains 91.01% of their total
variance (first eigenvariate¼ 8.12, second eigenvariate¼ 0.42).
Consequently, we used the scores for this underlying dimension
to quantify the LOA for each action phrase.
As shown in Table 2, independent-samples t-tests showed
that Why and How trials were matched not only on all lexical
parameters, but also on the average LOA of the question and an-
swer in each trial, which we henceforth call ‘Trialwise LOA.’ As
described below, our first two analyses exploit the orthogonality
of the Why/How manipulation and Trialwise LOA to identify
their independent effects. In contrast, our third analysis ex-
ploits the fact that Why and How trials differed in what we
henceforth call the ‘Signed LOA Shift’, which refers to the
within-trial change in LOA introduced by the answer phrase
relative to the question phrase. This is calculated for each trial
by subtracting the LOA of the question phrase (henceforth
called the ‘Prepotent LOA’) from the LOA of the answer phrase.
In line with the view that why and how questions produce rela-
tive increases and decreases in LOA, respectively, Why trials
were associated with positive Signed LOA Shifts while How tri-
als were associated with negative Signed LOA Shifts (Table 2).
Experimental task
The 150 test trials were presented to participants in an event-
related design. The trial structure and timing are shown in
Figure 1B. Trials were arranged in a pseudorandom order with a
variable onset asynchrony drawn from a pseudoexponential
distribution with a mean of 6000 ms (Min/Max¼ 5000/10 000 ms).
The order and onsets of trials were optimized for estimating the
why/how contrast. This was achieved by generating the design
matrices for one million pseudorandomly generated designs,
and for each summing the efficiencies of Why>How contrast
estimation. The most efficient design was used for all
participants.
Table 1. Pearson correlations among all phrase-level parameters
Parameter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Level of abstraction - 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.92 0.77 0.16 0.25 0.03 0.14
2 Abstract/concrete 0.99 - 0.96 0.95 0.89 0.74 0.17 0.26 0.06 0.14
3 Non-Imageable/imageable 0.97 0.96 - 0.93 0.83 0.76 0.14 0.24 0.07 0.15
4 Broad/specific 0.96 0.95 0.93 - 0.82 0.74 0.16 0.28 0.07 0.13
5 Mind/body 0.92 0.89 0.83 0.82 - 0.64 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.1
6 Valenced/neutral 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.64 - 0.13 0.2 0.13 0.1
7 Number of characters 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.13 - 0.04 0.35 0.02
8 Number of words 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.15 0.2 0.04 - 0.45 0
9 Content word frequency 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.35 0.45 - 0.06
10 Response time (s) 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.1 0.1 0.02 0 0.06 -
Notes. The first parameter—level of abstraction—represents the first eigenvariate from a principal components analysis on parameters 2–6. Parameters 7-10 were
included as parametric nuisance covariates in all single-subject fMRI analyses (represented at the trial level by averaging the parameter value for the question and an-
swer phrases). Note that because RT is a trial-level parameter and is contingent on participant behavior, all RT correlation values were computed as the mean within-
subject correlation between RT to each trial and the average parameter value across the question and answer phrases within each trial.
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Stimulus presentation and response recording were imple-
mented with the MATLAB Psychophysics Toolbox (version 3.0.9;
Brainard, 1997). An LCD projector was used to present the task
on a screen at the rear of the scanner bore that was visible to
participants through a mirror positioned on the head coil.
Participants were given a button box and made their yes/no
responses with their right-hand index/middle fingers. Prior to
the experimental task, participants performed a practice ver-
sion featuring trials not used in the experimental task.
Image acquisition
All imaging data were acquired at the Caltech Brain Imaging
Center using a Siemens Trio 3.0 Tesla MRI scanner outfitted
with a 32-channel phased-array headcoil. For the experimental
task, we acquired 909 T2*-weighted echoplanar image volumes
(EPIs; multiband acceleration factor¼ 4, slice thick-
ness¼ 2.5 mm, in-plane resolution¼ 2.5 2.5 mm, 56 slices,
Repetition Time¼ 1000 ms, Echo Time¼ 30 ms, flip angle¼ 60,
Field-of-View¼ 200 mm). Participants’ in-scan head motion was
minimal (max translation¼ 1.93 mm, max rotation¼ 1.75). We
also acquired an additional 1330 EPI volumes for each partici-
pant as part of a separate study. Finally, we acquired a high-
resolution anatomical T1-weighted image (1 mm isotropic) and
fieldmaps used to estimate and correct for inhomogeneity-
induced image distortion.
Image preprocessing
Images were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM8, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London,
UK). Each participant’s EPI timeseries was subjected to the fol-
lowing preprocessing steps: the first four volumes were dis-
carded to account for T1-equilibration effects; the realign and
unwarp procedure was used to perform distortion correction
and motion correction; their T1 structural volume was co-
registered to the mean of the corrected EPI volumes; group-wise
DARTEL registration (Ashburner, 2007) was used to normalize
the T1 volume to a group-specific template, with subsequent af-
fine registration to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space;
and all EPI volumes were normalized to MNI space using the
deformation flow fields from the previous step, which re-
sampled volumes (2 2 2 mm) and applied spatial smoothing
(6 mm Gaussian kernel, full-width at half-maximum).
Single-subject regression models
General linear models were used to estimate three models of
the EPI timeseries for each participant. The following proced-
ures were used in all three models. First, covariates of interest
excluded foil trials and trials to which the participant gave ei-
ther no response or the incorrect response. Excluded trials were
modelled in a separate nuisance covariate. Second, the neural
response to each trial was defined with variable epochs
(Grinband et al., 2008) spanning the onset of the question phrase
and the offset of the answer phrase (see Figure 1B). Third, all
models included trialwise nuisance covariates for variability in
response time (RT), character count, word count and average
content word frequency. The three lexical parameters pertain
only to the simple verb-complement action phrases, without
the why and how question markers. Each of these nuisance
covariates was constructed by modulating the amplitude of the
predicted neural response for each trial of interest by the
de-meaned parameter value. Fourth, all models included scan-
wise nuisance covariates for the six motion parameters esti-
mated from image realignment and a predictor for every
timepoint where in-brain global signal change (GSC) exceeded
2.5 SDs of the mean GSC or where estimated motion exceed
0.5 mm of translation or 0.5 of rotation. Finally, all models
used the canonical (double-gamma) response function and its
temporal derivative to model the hemodynamic response;
were high-pass filtered at 1/128 Hz; and were estimated
using the SPM8 RobustWLS toolbox, which implements robust
weighted least-squares estimation (Diedrichsen and Shadmehr,
2005).
Estimating the Independent Effects of Why/How Questions and
Trialwise LOA. The first two models were designed to assess the
independent contributions of two factors: variation in the ques-
tion in each trial (Why vs How), and variation in the Trialwise
LOA (average LOA for question and answer phrases). The mod-
els differed only in their representation of the factor corres-
ponding to Trial-wise LOA.
The first model included four covariates of interest corres-
ponding to the cells created by crossing factors corresponding
to the Question (Why vs How) and Trialwise LOA binarized into
a two-level factor (High vs Low). We binarized LOA using Otsu’s
method (implemented using GRAYTHRESH in MATLAB), which
selects the threshold that minimizes the variance within the
two bins. Independent-samples t-tests confirmed that Trialwise
LOA for trials binned as High LOA was significantly higher than
that for trials binned as Low LOA, t(109)¼ 20.57, P< 0.001.
Following estimation, we computed the [(High-Whyþ Low-
Why)> (High-Howþ Low-How)] contrast to identify regions
independently modulated by the Why/How factor, and the
[(High-WhyþHigh-How)> (Low-Whyþ Low-How)] contrast to
identify regions independently modulated by Trialwise LOA.
The second model included two covariates of interest corres-
ponding to trialwise variability in the Question (Why vs How)
and in LOA. These covariates were constructed by modulating
the height of the predicted neural response to each trial by a
value representing the Question (Why¼þ1; How¼1) and
Trialwise LOA. In addition to the nuisance covariates specified
above, this model also included a covariate corresponding to
the fixed-amplitude (time-invariant) response to each trial. For
subsequent group analysis, we computed two contrast images,
Table 2. Means for performance, lexical and level of abstraction
(LOA) parameters for both Why and How trials
Parameter group
Parameter name Why How Pdifference
Performance
Percent correct 94.72 94.14 0.463
Response time (s) 1.00 1.02 0.296
Lexical
Number of characters 11.90 12.02 0.712
Number of words 2.46 2.42 0.700
Content word frequency 3.80 3.81 0.957
Level of abstraction
Question-and-answer 0.44 0.44 0.964
Question 0.34 0.59 <0.001
Answer 0.57 0.32 <0.001
Answer–question 0.23 0.27 <0.001
Notes. The final column lists the P value from a t-test comparing the Why and
How trials on each parameter. Paired samples t-tests were used to compare the
performance parameters while independent samples t-tests were used for the
remaining parameters. To facilitate comparability, the LOA parameters were
computed after rescaling the LOA across phrases to 0–1.
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one for the modulator coding the Why/How contrast, and one
for the modulator coding Trialwise LOA.
Estimating the independent effects of the prepotent LOA and signed
LOA shift. The third and final model exploits the fact that
although Why and How trials were equated on Trialwise LOA,
they differed in the direction of the Signed LOA Shift (Table 2).
Moreover, the magnitude of these shifts varied across trials in a
way uncorrelated with variation in Trialwise LOA (r¼0.02).
Figure 4A shows that the magnitude of such shifts showed a
moderate negative correlation with the Prepotent LOA
(r¼0.49), defined earlier as the LOA of the question phrase. If
the active ingredients of why/how questions are increases/de-
creases in LOA, respectively, then brain regions associated with
the why/how contrast in prior work should track the magnitude
of the Within-Trial Shift in LOA relative to the Prepotent LOA.
Hence, this model included two covariates of interest corres-
ponding to trialwise variability in both of these measures. To
ensure that any shift-related effects were due to signed shifts,
we included an additional nuisance covariate for the unsigned
(absolute) LOA shifts. As in the second model, this model also
included a covariate of no interest corresponding to the fixed-
amplitude response to each trial. For subsequent group ana-
lysis, we computed two contrast images, one for the modulator
coding the Prepotent LOA, and one for the modulator coding the
Signed LOA Shift.
Group analyses
Contrasts were first interrogated using a set of independently
defined left-hemisphere regions of interest (ROI) based on the
group-level Why/How contrasts from Study 1 and Study 3
reported in Spunt and Adolphs (2014). These images are publicly
available on NeuroVault (http://neurovault.org/collections/445/).
We selected five ROIs from both the Why>How and
How>Why contrasts (Figure 2). The peak coordinate and spatial
extent of each ROI is provided in Supplementary Table S2. For
each ROI, we tested our hypotheses with t-tests on the average
parameter estimate across voxels. Confidence intervals (CIs)
were estimated using the bias-corrected and accelerated per-
centile method (10 000 random samples with replacement; im-
plemented using BOOTCI in MATLAB).
ROI analyses were complemented by whole-brain analyses.
We conducted one-sample t-tests on single-subject con-
trast images for effects of interest. The resulting group-level t-
statistic images were interrogated by applying a cluster-forming
threshold of P< 0.001 followed by cluster-level correction at a
family-wise error (FWE) of 0.05. Thresholded results were sur-
face rendered using SurfPlot (http://mrtools.mgh.harvard.edu/
index.php/SurfPlot).
Results
Behavioral results
Table 2 displays the mean percentage correct and RT to correct
responses across Why and How trials. Paired-sample t-tests
yielded no evidence for Why/How effect on either outcome
(Ps> 0.295). Given that the LOA factors examined in the regres-
sion models were based only on trials with correct responses,
we tested the effect of LOA only on RT to correct trials. We first
tested this with the binarized LOA factor used in the factorial
model. A paired-samples t-test showed that RTs to High LOA tri-
als (M¼ 1035 ms, SD¼ 143) were longer than RTs to Low LOA
trials (M¼ 965 ms, SD¼ 137), t(16)¼ 5.52, P< 0.001, 95% CIBoot [48,
96]. Next, we tested for a non-zero within-subject correlation of
RT and Trialwise LOA. A one-sample t-test showed that the
within-subject correlation between RT and Trialwise LOA
(rmean¼ 0.14, rSD¼ 0.08) was reliably above zero, t(16)¼ 6.89,
P< .001, 95% CIBoot [0.10, 0.17].
These effects of Trialwise LOA on RT underscore the import-
ance of controlling for within-subject performance variability
on the measured fMRI signal. Indeed, as shown in
Supplementary Table S5 and Figure S1, longer RTs were indeed
associated with activity in a distributed cortical network con-
sistent with regions observed in previous studies examining the
executive aspects of semantic memory use (Badre et al., 2005;
Binder et al., 2005; Goldberg et al., 2007; Hoffman et al., 2010;
Raposo et al., 2012; Satpute et al., 2014). Critically, the imaging
results presented below are statistically independent of these
RT effects.
Imaging results
Effects of why/how questions and trialwise LOA. Table 3 shows
ROI-specific results for the first and second models that exam-
ine the independent contributions of Question (Why vs How)
and binarized Trialwise LOA. Remarkably, neither model pro-
duced evidence for a Why/How effect in any of the 10 ROIs
examined. In contrast, the Trialwise LOA factor in both models
showed a reliable effect on the same 8/10 ROIs, including 5/5 of
the ROIs selected for showing an effect in the Why>How con-
trast in prior studies.
These findings are largely reproduced in the whole-brain
analysis (Supplementary Table S3). Neither model yielded evi-
dence for a reliable Why/How effect in any region. In contrast,
the Trialwise LOA factor modulated a largely left-lateralized
cortical network that was consistently localized across both
models. As shown in Figure 3, higher LOAs were consistently
associated with regions of the medial PFC, anterior STS, tem-
poral pole, TPJ, and precuneus, while lower LOAs were consist-
ently associated with the posterior MTG, rostral IPL, and regions
of the IFG around the pars triangularis. Several clusters were
only observed in the second model examining parametric vari-
ation in Trialwise LOA. This included bilateral regions of middle
occipital cortex that were associated with increasing Trialwise
LOA. Although not predicted, this finding is consistent with
Fig. 2. Left hemisphere cortical regions reliably modulated by the Why/How con-
trast in prior work. See Methods and Supplementary Table S2 for further details.
TPJ¼Temporoparietal Junction; PFC¼ Prefrontal Cortex; STS¼Superior
Temporal Sulcus; PCC¼ Posterior Cingulate Cortex; IPL¼ Inferior Parietal Lobule;
PMC¼Premotor Cortex; MTG¼Middle Temporal Gyrus.
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recent work showing a left middle occipital association with
abstraction (Gilead et al., 2014). Moreover, decreasing Trialwise
LOA yielded more extensive regional associations in the second
model, including regions of the ventral PMC and presupplemen-
tary motor area.
Effects of the prepotent LOA and signed LOA shift. Table 4 shows
ROI-specific results for the third model examining the
Prepotent LOA and the Signed LOA Shift. Parametric variation in
Prepotent LOA showed largely the same effects observed for the
Trialwise LOA parameters examined by the first two models,
and this observation was reproduced by the whole-brain ana-
lysis (Figure 4B; Supplementary Table S4). More interestingly,
however, when examining the Signed LOA Shift, we found evi-
dence for a positive association with four of the five ROIs from
the Why>How contrast (the effect in the TPJ ROI was also in
the expected direction, P¼ 0.062). And although none of the a
priori ROIs based on the How>Why contrast showed a signifi-
cant negative association with the Signed LOA Shift, four of five
were in the expected direction. In the whole-brain analysis, the
Table 3. Results of two-tailed paired-sample t-tests on percent signal change in the set of a priori regions of interest (ROI) for the two models
examining the independent effects of Why/How manipulation and trialwise level of abstraction (LOA)
Model 1 Model 2
ROI source Question: Why>How LOA: High> Low Question: Why>How Increasing LOA
Region name t P 95% CI T P 95% CI t P 95% CI t P 95% CI
Why>How
Dorsomedial PFC 0.54 0.595 [0.12, 0.17] 3.84 0.001 [0.21, 0.65] 0.63 0.535 [0.1, 0.15] 4.00 0.001 [0.04, 0.11]
Ventromedial PFC 0.24 0.816 [0.11, 0.15] 4.31 <0.001 [0.17, 0.42] 0.57 0.577 [0.06, 0.18] 3.32 0.004 [0.02, 0.08]
Anterior STS 0.93 0.366 [0.02, 0.07] 5.67 <0.001 [0.09, 0.19] 1.21 0.242 [0.02, 0.07] 4.49 <0.001 [0.02, 0.04]
TPJ 0.77 0.454 [0.06, 0.13] 4.06 <0.001 [0.10, 0.27] 0.41 0.688 [0.08, 0.12] 2.77 0.014 [0.01, 0.05]
PCC 0.24 0.811 [0.07, 0.09] 4.01 0.001 [0.08, 0.24] 0.21 0.840 [0.08, 0.09] 2.95 0.009 [0.01, 0.05]
How>Why
Dorsal PMC 0.57 0.575 [0.09, 0.06] 1.11 0.283 [0.16, 0.03] 1.15 0.269 [0.11, 0.04] 1.19 0.252 [0.06, 0]
Ventral PMC 0.08 0.939 [0.07, 0.07] 2.42 0.028 [0.27, 0.05] 0.65 0.526 [0.09, 0.04] 2.99 0.009 [0.07, 0.02]
Posterior MTG 0.05 0.960 [0.07, 0.08] 3.57 0.003 [0.36, 0.12] 0.35 0.734 [0.09, 0.06] 3.99 0.001 [0.09, 0.03]
Rostral IPL 0.62 0.543 [0.03, 0.08] 2.52 0.023 [0.27, 0.05] 0.24 0.814 [0.04, 0.07] 2.65 0.018 [0.06, 0.01]
Dorsal precuneus 0.21 0.837 [0.11, 0.07] 1.57 0.135 [0.01, 0.2] 0.62 0.547 [0.13, 0.06] 1.57 0.136 [0.01, 0.04]
Note. Both models featured the same two covariates of interest: variation in the question posed in each trial (Why vs How) and trialwise variation in the LOA, computed
as the mean LOA for the Question and Answer phrases appearing within the trial. Whereas Model 1 examines the trialwise LOA as a categorical variable with two levels
(High vs Low), the Model 2 examines it as a continuous parametric modulator of the response to each trial (see Methods for further details regarding model construc-
tion and contrast calculations). The examined ROIs are displayed in Figure 2 and further details can be found in the main text and in Supplementary Table S2.
Confidence intervals (CIs) for the effect size in each comparison were estimated using the bias corrected and accelerated percentile method (10 000 random samples
with replacement; implemented using the BOOTCI function in MATLAB).
Fig. 3. Whole-brain surface renderings of regional activity associated with Trialwise Level of Abstraction (LOA), computed as the mean of the question and answer
phrases appearing in each trial. The results in (A) show regions modulated in the categorical High>Low LOA contrast from Model 1, while the results in (B) show re-
gions modulated by the continuous Trialwise LOA parameter from Model 2. Significant clusters were identified in a whole-brain search thresholded at a cluster-level
family-wise error rate of 0.05, and their locations are reported in Supplementary Table S3. To provide information about extent and for display purposes only, the
cluster-corrected maps were minimally dilated prior to surface rendering.
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dorsomedial PFC and the anterior STS showed a positive associ-
ation with the Signed LOA Shift (Figure 4C; Supplementary
Table S4). No regions, however, were found to show a negative
association with the Signed LOA Shift.
Discussion
We investigated the neural basis of conceptualizing the same
actions at different LOAs. This was directly motivated by previ-
ous neuroimaging studies showing that why and how questions
about actions differentially activate cortical networks associ-
ated with mental-state reasoning and action representation,
respectively. Since these studies always asked why and how
questions about the same action stimuli (named or visually pre-
sented), they confounded the task manipulation (why/how ques-
tions) with the use of action concepts that varied in LOA. We
deconfounded these two factors in order to evaluate two alter-
native functional accounts of the cortical networks known to be
modulated by the why/how contrast. We found no support for
the account that why and how questions per se elicit distinct
and content-free cognitive sets for conceptualizing action.
Instead, the evidence supported the alternative account that
the distinct effects of why and how questions are caused by the
relative increases and decreases in the conceptual LOA they
tend to produce, respectively.
Brain regions for conceptualizing an action at different
LOAs
Increasing LOAs were associated with the set of left hemisphere
regions reliably associated with the Why>How contrast in pre-
vious studies (Figure 2; Spunt et al., 2010, 2011; Spunt and
Fig. 4. (A) Scatterplot showing the relationship between the Prepotent LOA and the signed Within-Trial Shift in LOA across Why (black markers) and How (white
markers) trials. The Prepotent LOA refers to the LOA of the action phrase appearing in the question at the beginning of each trial. The signed within-trial shift in LOA is
computed for each trial by subtracting the Prepotent LOA from the LOA of the action phrase appearing in the presented answer. Positive shift trials induced an upward
change in LOA, while negative shift trials induced a downward change in LOA. To facilitate comparability, the LOA dimension has been rescaled to 0–1. (B) Regions
uniquely associated with the Prepotent LOA parameter when controlling for the signed within-trial shift in LOA. (C) Regions uniquely associated with the signed
within-trial shift in LOA parameter. Significant clusters were identified in a whole-brain search thresholded at a cluster-level family-wise error rate of 0.05, and their lo-
cations are reported in Supplementary Table S4. To provide information about extent and for display purposes only, the cluster-corrected maps were minimally dilated
prior to surface rendering.
Table 4. Results of two-tailed paired-sample t-tests on percent signal change in the set of a priori regions of interest (ROI) for the model examin-
ing the independent effects of the prepotent level of abstraction (LOA) and the signed shift in LOA for each trial
ROI source Effect name
Prepotent LOA Signed LOA Shift
Region name t P 95% CI t P 95% CI
Why>How
Dorsomedial PFC 4.53 <0.001 [0.04, 0.10] 2.87 0.011 [0.01, 0.07]
Ventromedial PFC 3.10 0.007 [0.02, 0.08] 2.81 0.013 [0.02, 0.07]
Anterior STS 4.47 <0.001 [0.02, 0.04] 4.02 <0.001 [0.01, 0.03]
TPJ 3.06 0.008 [0.01, 0.06] 2.00 0.062 [0, 0.05]
PCC 2.75 0.014 [0.01, 0.05] 2.63 0.018 [0.01, 0.04]
How>Why
Dorsal PMC 1.15 0.266 [0.06, 0] 0.96 0.351 [0.03, 0.01]
Ventral PMC 2.78 0.014 [0.06, 0.01] 1.83 0.086 [0.05, 0]
Posterior MTG 4.17 <0.001 [0.08, 0.03] 1.88 0.078 [0.04, 0]
Rostral IPL 2.70 0.016 [0.06, 0.01] 0.95 0.358 [0.03, 0.01]
Dorsal precuneus 1.66 0.117 [0.01, 0.05] 1.99 0.064 [0, 0.04]
Note. The model featured two covariates of interest: the LOA of the Question phrase (i.e. Prepotent LOA) and the signed shift in LOA introduced in the Answer phrase,
computed by subtracting the LOA of the Question phrase from that of the Answer phrase (see Methods for further details regarding model construction and contrast
calculations). The examined ROIs are displayed in Figure 2 and further details can be found in the main text and in Supplementary Table S2. Confidence intervals (CIs)
for the effect size in each comparison were estimated using the bias corrected and accelerated percentile method (10 000 random samples with replacement; imple-
mented using the BOOTCI function in MATLAB).
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Lieberman, 2012a,b; Spunt and Adolphs, 2014). These regions
partially overlap with several meta-analytically defined func-
tional networks, including: (i) the so-called ‘theory-of-mind’ or
‘mentalizing’ network associated with tasks of mental-state
reasoning (Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006;
Saxe, 2006; Carrington and Bailey, 2009; Van Overwalle and
Baetens, 2009; Schurz et al., 2014); (ii) the default mode network
(DMN), especially its dorsomedial PFC component (Raichle et al.,
2001; Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010, 2014); (iii)
the network associated with mentally simulating episodes both
past and future (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009;
Schacter et al., 2012); (iv) the network associated with compre-
hending narrative discourse (Ferstl and von Cramon, 2001;
Ferstl et al., 2008; Mar, 2011; Nijhof and Willems, 2015); (v) the
network associated with transmodal semantic processing
(Binder et al., 2009; Binder and Desai, 2011) and (vi) the network
associated with comprehending abstract compared to concrete
words (Binder et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2010; Binder and Desai,
2011).
Decreasing LOAs were associated with the majority of the
left hemisphere regions reliably associated with the How>Why
contrast in previous work. These regions fall within a broader
functional network responsive to cognitive tasks devoid of
meaningful socioemotional content (Van Overwalle, 2011; Jack
et al., 2012). But they are more frequently regarded as forming a
subset of the functional network thought to enable representa-
tion of the visual and somatomotor features of actions when
they are perceived, performed, conceptualized, and verbally
processed (Caspers et al., 2010; Kemmerer et al., 2012;
Molenberghs et al., 2012; Pulvermuller, 2013; Watson et al., 2013;
Rizzolatti et al., 2014; Urgesi et al., 2014; Kemmerer, 2015). This
included a region of the left posterior MTG that has been associ-
ated with encoding the visual motion components of action
concepts (Chen et al., 2008; Deen and McCarthy, 2010; Saygin
et al., 2010; Wallentin et al., 2011; Humphreys et al., 2013; Watson
et al., 2013). Interestingly, this seems to contrast with the view
that the left posterior MTG represents more schematic aspects
of the event structures encoded by both action and non-action
verbs/sentences (Bedny et al., 2008, 2012).
Does the LOA construct help integrate this diverse set of
findings? Several proposals have attempted to integrate at least
a subset of these findings, but these have primarily regarded
the regions associated with increasing LOA in the present study,
which we have recently demonstrated map well on to the dor-
somedial PFC subsystem of the DMN (Spunt et al., 2015). For
instance, Buckner and Carroll (2007) suggest that mental-state
reasoning, perspective-taking, episodic memory, and prospec-
tion all depend on a process they call ‘self-projection’, which in-
volves the mental simulation of events and experiences that
transcend the immediate environment. Mar and Oatley (2008)
suggest a similar process of simulation to describe the intense
social and emotional experiences that literary narratives are
capable of evoking (see also Nijhof and Willems, 2015). Finally,
Liberman and Trope (2014; Trope and Liberman, 2010) assert
that mental representations can all be characterized by how
‘psychologically distant’ they are from ‘a common zero-distance
point, which is the experienced reality of me here and now”
(Liberman and Trope, 2014, 1). While these theories have been
primarily focused on the process of abstracting away from
sensorimotor experiences (corresponding to increasing LOA in
the present study), others have been primarily concerned with
understanding the neural bases of relevant conceptual dual-
isms, such as between embodied and disembodied semantics
(Pulvermuller, 2013) or between social and physical
knowledge domains (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Jack
et al., 2012).
What these accounts all seem to share is a concern with
understanding the human brain’s ability for abstract thought,
and distinguishing that ability from the one enabling concrete
thought. The present study shares this concern in the important
domain of action understanding, taking as its point of departure
the idea that people naturally think about their actions as hav-
ing a hierarchical structure. Such a point of departure over-
comes a number of theoretical limitations of existing proposals.
One such limitation is that prior proposals have typically
focused on just one side of the conceptual coin, namely, on
mental processes involved in abstraction. The present account
parsimoniously handles both sides of the coin by identifying
upward movements with abstraction and downward move-
ments with the human ability to ground their abstract ideas in
sensory experience and motor acts. Proposals that are con-
cerned with both sides of the coin are limited by a tendency to
frame the distinction as a conceptual dichotomy or dualism.
The present account naturally permits representations to vary
on a continuous dimension corresponding to the levels of a con-
ceptual hierarchy. Finally, prior accounts have paid very little
attention to identifying the specific task conditions and mental
processes by which people shift their level of understanding.
The present account is grounded in an ecologically valid
method for eliciting such shifts: The Why/How Task.
Limitations and future directions
We identify several limitations of the present study that offer
worthwhile directions for future research. First, we acknow-
ledge the preliminary status of our empirical definition of LOA.
The five semantic dimensions used to define the LOA factor
were not intended to provide a complete and definitive list of
semantic dimensions constituting LOA. There are likely many
additional dimensions that could be included in an expanded
definition of LOA. For instance, compare ‘sharing knowledge’ to
‘typing words’ as descriptions of the same act of writing a scien-
tific paper. Compared to the latter, the former description gives
the act a place in a pursuit that is more difficult, long-term, and
socially relevant than does the latter description. Lin et al. (2014)
recently showed that some of the brain regions tracking
increasing LOA in the present study showed enhanced
activation for action verbs that typically refer to social inter-
actions (e.g., embrace), relative to verbs for individual actions
(e.g. walk). They did not, however, measure any of the five
dimensions of LOA featured in the present study, nor did they
include RT as a nuisance covariate, making it difficult to ascer-
tain to what extent a ‘sociality’ dimension adds anything dis-
tinctive to the concept of LOA as presented here. Similarly, it is
likely that dimensions (e.g. mind vs body) that are useful for
describing LOA in one conceptual domain (e.g. human action)
will prove less useful for describing LOA in other conceptual
domains (e.g. mathematical knowledge).
Second, we emphasize that we are not proposing that each
of the five dimensions included in this study does not possess a
unique and useful meaning on its own. The decision to focus on
their shared variance was primarily motivated by the nature of
our research question, which was to examine action conceptu-
alization along a single dimension of hierarchical representa-
tion. Importantly, this decision was also empirically supported
by a PCA on ratings of the five dimensions, which showed that a
single factor could explain >91% of their total variance. Hence,
we ultimately restricted our analyses to the derived LOA factor
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and did not examine any of the dimensions individually. While
these dimensions were highly correlated in the present study
and may naturally correlate in language about actions, there is
at least some evidence that they can be dissociated experimen-
tally. For instance, recent work provides evidence for unique
effects of concreteness, imageability, and valence in the neural
responses to action verbs (Skipper and Olson, 2014; Vigliocco
et al., 2014).
Third, we consider how our experimental task design could
be adjusted to allow examination of novel questions regarding
the neural bases of hierarchical action representation. In par-
ticular, we chose to present each question–answer pair in rapid
succession, with the question offset and answer onset divided
by a 250 ms blank screen (see Figure 1B). This had the benefit of
minimizing working memory load and spontaneous answer
production during the interval between question and answer
presentation. This benefit came with a cost in that it prevented
us from being able to separate the responses to question and
answer presentation. Given that the magnitude of the Signed
LOA Shift is ultimately established by presentation of the
answer phrase, future studies may be able to more precisely
model the onset of the within-trial shift by introducing an opti-
mal amount of jitter between the question and answer onsets.
However, modeling the onset of the shift at answer onset would
still lack precision since the question marker (i.e. why vs how)
provides unambiguous information about the sign of the immi-
nent shift. This coupled with the high likelihood of spontaneous
answer production in response to question presentation makes
it likely that, in fact, the Signed LOA Shift of interest in our final
model actually begins prior to answer presentation.
Finally, we identify two points of clarification regarding our
claim that the primary function of why and how questions is to
motivate increases or decreases in LOA, respectively. The first
regards the possibility that, even when controlling for the
stimulus content, the brain states evoked by why and how ques-
tions may be dissociable in subtle ways not detectable using
univariate methods. Future studies could test for such effects
using multivariate methods such as pattern-information ana-
lysis (Kriegeskorte and Kievit, 2013). The second regards the
misinterpretation, briefly discussed above, that this means that
why vs how is not to be considered a meaningful cognitive dis-
tinction. We believe the contribution of the present study is to
more precisely specify the distinct effects that these two ques-
tions have on cognition. As discussed above, these effects
require that the two questions are motivated by the same action
stimulus. When this condition is met, it will almost always be
the case that a why question will yield an answer that is at a
higher LOA than will a how question. If this condition is not
met, the effects will be unreliable and may sometimes reverse
entirely. This is because, as noted in the Introduction, each
question can be posed at any LOA, making it possible for a why
question to yield an answer that rests at a lower LOA (Q: Why
grip handlebars? A: Ride a bike.) than an answer to a how ques-
tion (Q: How to stay healthy? A: Get exercise.). By way of summa-
rizing, we offer the simple analogy: asking why vs how is akin to
pressing the up vs down buttons when calling an elevator. As
long as you’re starting from the same floor, you can rest assured
that pressing up will almost always put you on a higher floor
than will pressing down.
Conclusion
We used a novel action understanding task with functional MRI
to examine the neural basis of the well-documented effects of
answering why and how questions about actions. Our data con-
clusively demonstrate that these effects can be attributed to the
fact that why and how questions—when asked of the same
action—produce systematic changes in action understanding,
and do so on what appears to be a single hierarchical dimen-
sion, which we refer to as the LOA (Vallacher and Wegner, 1985;
Vallacher and Wegner, 1987). Increases and decreases in LOA
tracked dissociable brain networks, consistent with prior work
using the Why/How contrast. Our data particularly highlight
the role of the dorsomedial PFC and anterior STS in upward
shifts in LOA. Such shifts make it possible for people to conceive
the ‘here-and-now’ of physical reality—including their own
bodies—in abstract terms. This, in turn, gives us the power to
appreciate that even the simplest of motor actions can carry
information about who we are and what we care about most.
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